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DISCURSIVE TYPOLOGIES AND MORAL VALUES IN STEM CELL 
POLITICS, REGULATION AND COMMERCIALISATION: 
SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
 
Ann Bruce♥ & Shawn H.E. Harmon♠ 
 
Abstract: Great importance is attached to, and great controversy 
surrounds, biotechnology generally and stem cell research more 
specifically, particularly human embryonic stem cell research.  Given 
its position at the vanguard of innovations in theoretical and applied 
human healthcare science, and as a source of political conflict and 
achievement, it is useful to  examine attitudes toward, and actions 
around, embryonic stem cell research.  This article conceives of three 
discursive typologies and explores their deployment in three different 
settings or sites in the life or progress of embryonic stem cell research, 
namely, the political (determining legal boundaries), the hybrid 
(identifying and enforcing boundaries for laboratory research), and the 
administrative (enforcing boundaries in the commercial context), the 
intention being to determine whether these typologies are consistent 
and what moral values their use supports.  This article concludes that 
the typologies are deployed to varying degrees in the different sites, 
and with varying degrees of success.  Although this might be expected, 
and not altogether unwarranted, given the different roles and 
objectives of the primary institutions at each site, the current 
prevalence of the typologies suggests that these institutions might not 
be operating optimally from the democracy enhancement and 
transparency points of view. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is perhaps now trite to say that great importance is attached to, and great 
controversy surrounds, biotechnology generally and stem cell research (SCR) more 
specifically, particularly human embryonic stem cell research (ESC).  There are a 
variety of ESC-based applications under development, the lead one being treatment 
for spinal cord injury developed by Geron Corporation and awaiting US Food and 
Drug Administration approval for clinical trials.1  Similarly, there is a plethora of 
ethical issues that must be navigated by those in the field, including appropriate and 
sensitive sourcing of embryos (and donor consent), respectful treatment of the embryo 
during research, avoidance of prohibited activities in relation to embryos 
(reproductive cloning, chimeric production, etc.), appropriate commercialisation of 
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1  See http://www.geron.com/, and http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/08/transcripts/2008-
0471t1-01.htm. 
ESC-derived products, and more.2  Much has happened in the relatively short lifespan 
of ESC research, and in many ways, it has become the hot health science of the new 
millennium.  Given its position at the vanguard of innovations in theoretical and 
applied human healthcare science,3 and at the pinnacle of political conflict,4 and legal 
achievement,5 there is significant utility in examining attitudes toward, and actions 
around, ESCR. 
This article undertakes one element of that examination.  It conceives of three 
discursive “typologies”6 and explores their deployment over time and in different 
settings: 
 
(1) a sampling of the debates which lead to the adoption of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001 
(2001 Regulations)7 in the UK;8 
 
(2) an application to vary a license permitting derivation of ESC lines 
using nuclear transfer and parthenogenetically activated oocytes, and 
the consequent decision by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) 9 and 
                                                 
2  For more on these, see The UK Stem Cell Initiative, Report and Recommendations of The UK 
Stem Cell Initiative (2005), at http://www.advisorybodies.doh.gov.uk/uksci/uksci-reportnov05.pdf, 
EMB, Stem Cell Research: Status, Prospects, Prerequisites (2006), at 
http://www.embo.org/scisoc/stem_celli.pdf, F. Fukuyama & F. Furger, Beyond Bioethics: A Proposal 
for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies (2006), at 
http://www.isscr.org/about/index.htm, and many more. 
3  Although it is conceded that there is perhaps inadequate support for basic science, ground-
breaking projects are underway which will have implications (in the not too distant future) for 
pharmaceutical toxicity testing, genetic diagnostics and stem cell therapies: DLA Piper & Scottish 
Stem Cell Network, “Commercialisation Strategies in Regenerative Medicine” Workshop, 17 July 
2008, Edinburgh. 
4  With respect to conflict, we note the heated Parliamentary debates that preceded the adoption 
of both the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, as well as that surrounding the recently back-
burnered Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007, which amends the regime created by the 
former instruments: see M. Mulkay, “Rhetorics of Hope and Fear in the Great Embryo Debate” (1993) 
23 Social Studies of Science 721-742, S. Parry, “The Politics of Cloning: Mapping the Rhetorical 
Convergence of Embryos and Stem Cells in Parliamentary Debates” (2003) 22 New Genomics & 
Society 177-198, and the ongoing coverage of recent activities in Bionews 
(http://www.bionews.org.uk/). 
5  With respect to achievement, we note the widely held view that the UK’s reproductive 
medicine regime is a pragmatic but principled and durable system that has appropriately been 
emulated, at least in part, in jurisdictions around the world: see Department of Health, (2005), Review 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A Public Consultation, at 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Consultations/Closedconsultations/DH_4123863, and House of Commons 
Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill (2006), First Report of the House of 
Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtembryos/169/16901.htm. 
6  The “typologies” explored represent different ways of expressing views rather than the actual 
views expressed; they are the main types of arguments being made by stakeholders. 
7  SI 2001/188, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2001/20010188.htm. 
8  Specifically, the Hansard for the House of Commons debates on 17 November 2000 and 19 
December 2000, and in the House of Lords on 22 January 2001, both available at 
http://www.publications/parliament.uk/pa/. 
9  Specifically, the Minutes of the HFEA’s Research Licence Committee meetings held on 17 
May 2006, 11 July 2006, and 14 September 2006, all available at 
 
(3) an example of a challenge to the patenting of an ESC-based invention, 
and the consequent decision of the European Patent Office (EPO).10 
 
These three nodes represent three distinct sites in the life of ESC research, from the 
purely political (determining legality), to the mixed political and administrative or 
hybrid (determining and enforcing technical boundaries), to the more traditionally 
administrative (permitting/enforcing monopoly rights over ESC-derived inventions). 
At the outset, we acknowledge our indebtedness to the discursive analyses that 
have preceded (and informed) this article.  For example, after extensive interviews 
and studies, Tait offered an approach to understanding the basis of arguments 
surrounding regulation of genetically modified crops in the EU, identifying two main 
types of arguments: (1) interest-based characterised by a willingness to change with 
evidence, is restricted to specific applications, and is typified in the negative by the 
statement “not-in-my-backyard”; and (2) value-based, characterised by a commitment 
to a specific value-basis, is not open to change with evidence, and is typified in the 
negative by the statement “not-in-anybody’s backyard”.11  She concluded that the risk 
regulatory approach originally applied to the release of GM crops was historically 
developed  to negotiate interest-based arguments, but that there was no mechanism for 
expressing value-based (or alternative-futures based) concerns except as and through 
risk-based procedures, thereby exposing a mismatch between regulatory instruments 
and individual concerns.  Later, and on a different path, Evans examined interest and 
value-based arguments in the US human genetics research setting, concluding that the 
American policy debates tended to narrow so that only interest-based views (which 
are easier for regulators to deal with) were considered.12 
The above suggests that the arenas of discursive analysis and regulatory 
interaction with interests and values are both fruitful and important areas of research 
which can contribute to our understanding of both policy-making processes and 
outcomes, and of the motivations underlying the choice of particular policy paths over 
others.  The present article is a case study based on a  sampling of data to develop a 
preliminary analysis on (1) whether different typologies are represented to different 
degrees in different sites, and, if so, whether this is appropriate and what this says 
about the institutions at these sites, and (2) what moral values are engaged or 
advanced by the deployment of these typologies. 
 
I. THE TYPOLOGIES EXPLORED: WAYS TO DEFEND/ATTACK 
STEM CELL RESEARCH 
 
Three general types of arguments (or typologies) are considered,: (1) the Core Values 
(or Red / Green Button Issues) typology; (2) the Evidence-to-Consequence (or Crystal 
Ball) typology; and (3) the Competing Interests (or See-Saw) typology, citing 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Variation_of_licence_to_include_additional_sources_of_eggs_for_resear
ch.pdf. 
10  Specifically, the Minutes of the EPO’s Opposition Division proceedings on 22 July 2002, and 
the Opposition Division’s Written Decision dated 21 July 2003, both available at 
http://www.epoline.org/portal/. 
11  J. Tait, “More Faust than Frankenstein: the European Debate about the Precautionary 
Principle and Risk Regulation for Genetically Modified Crops” (2001) 4 Journal of Risk Research  
175-189, at 179. 
12  J. Evans, Playing God? Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public 
Bioethical Debate (London: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
examples of their use by interviewees during recent empirical research.13 
 
(1) The “Core Values” or “Red / Green Button Issues” Typology 
 
Arguments under this banner are grounded on and seek to advance fundamental 
values (ie: values that the advocate esteems and feels should be respected).  Such 
arguments are closely associated with deontological ideas insofar as they are 
concerned with morality and duties, and they may well be influenced by entrenched 
(or hard-to-change) cultural ideas about good and bad.  Ultimately, this typology 
questions whether there are barriers that we should not be breaking, or, alternatively, 
absolute goods that we must be seeking.14  From a structural point of view, they often 
begin with a description of “how things are”, and then shift into a consideration of 
what elements of this reality must be maintained or changed to advance the values 
deemed most worthy.  Thus, from a basic starting opinion of how things are (which is 
not necessarily evidence-based), a position is taken and a number of conclusions are 
believed to flow from this. 
As suggested above, the epistemology of value positions varies from person to 
person, with sources ranging from sacred texts, to scientific texts, to values 
transmitted from person to person over time (ie: cultural presuppositions or culture-
based ideals).  Where fundamental values are derived from sources that are not shared 
by advocates, there are reduced possibilities for meetings of the mind.  For example, 
values based on sacred texts may be viewed as “irrational” to those not sharing them, 
but viewed as completely consistent and rational within the context of the advocate’s 
value system.15 Alternatively, scientific arguments may be viewed as excessively 
reductionist and limited to too narrow a range of issues by those whose positions 
include consideration of wider aspects (eg: the appropriate relationship of humans to 
each other). 
In the ESC research context, fundamental values are most commonly deployed 
(either consciously or otherwise) in assessments of what it is to be human, and, what, 
if any, limits should be erected in relation to scientific research.  For example, values 
emergent from the advocate’s opinion of what it means to be human are brought to 
bear on the embryo, and they determine whether an embryo is considered to have full 
moral status, on the one hand, or no moral status, on the other, or something in-
between.  The following are examples of arguments made during the empirical 
research that fall within this typology:16 
                                                 
13  A. Bruce, “Interests and Values in Risk-Related Stakeholder Interactions Project” (see 
http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/innogen/research/governanceregulationandpublicinterest/projecttitl
e,2509,en.html).  Bruce conducted one-hour interviews with specialist stakeholders in the SCR 
community between October 2004 and December 2005.  Interviewees were targeted to cover as wide a 
range of views as possible, and included research scientists and technicians, people in the industrial and 
policy-making sectors, consultant physicians, and members of pro and anti-ESCR advocacy groups.  
Interviews were recorded and transcribed and subsequently analysed. 
14  As suggested by the above, although value-based arguments are often depicted in the negative 
(ie: the absolute moral status of the embryo serves as a restriction on research), the opposite pole (ie: all 
research on embryos should be allowed) must also be based on fundamental values since there is no a 
priori reason for taking one stance rather than the other.  In short, there are a lot more value-based 
arguments being made than typically get accepted in popular (and academic) media. 
15  This phenomenon has been referred to as “value rationality” as opposed to “instrumental 
rationality”: see M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. 1 (NY: 
Bedminster Press, 1968). 
16  It should be noted that neither these examples, nor the ones identified below, represent an 
exhaustive list of the use of these typologies during the empirical research. 
 
• The moral status of the embryo is that of a fully-grown adult human.  We 
would not carry out research like this on other humans, so we shouldn’t 
conduct such (destructive) research on embryos either. 
 
• An embryo has no moral status; it is just a ball of cells obtained through 
biopsy.  Thus, there are no problems with using them in socially beneficial 
research. 
 
• Humans are valuable and should never be instrumentalised.  Creating embryos 
for research transforms humans into, and treats them as, a resource, which is 
disrespectful and wrong. 
 
• Helping others is an absolute good.  Science and researchers have 
responsibilities to provide cures and therapies to people in need. 
 
Of course, as demonstrated above, because the opinion of “how things are” is 
informed by fundamental values – which are often deep-lying and ingrained – 
opinions can be taken for granted (held with very little critical assessment), assumed 
to be shared (considered self-evidently good and universal), and static (unlikely to be 
significantly altered by evidence or arguments from different value perspectives).17  
Moreover, as suggested above, arguments of this type are triggered by emotive or 
“red button / green button” issues. 
 
(2) The “Evidence-to-Consequence” or “Crystal Ball” Typology 
 
Arguments of this type, though often value-laden, are future(s) oriented and tend to 
rely on some evidence base.  Indeed, their utilisation of evidence makes them seem 
much more objective than the previous typology insofar as they seem more provable.  
However, poorly understood natural phenomena, scientific uncertainties, the very 
nature of horizon-gazing, and the influence of culture (again) all introduce variables 
over which there is much to debate (from an evidentiary point of view).  For example, 
while most would agree that there is some value in SC research, advocates of the 
different types of SC research often disagree  over the prospects for each type of 
research, each drawing on current scientific evidence.  Disagreements over their 
future potential may stem from: 
 
• diverging opinions as to the rigour and meaning of previously reported 
research; or 
 
• conflicting judgements on potentiality based on past experiences (eg: one’s 
experience with the difficulties of tissue engineering may make one more 
sceptical of the promises of ESC research). 
 
Whatever their basis, it is clear that there is no absolutely neutral or purely objective 
scientific evidence (or interpretation of the evidence).  As such, while an evidence-
based approach may appeal to technocratic systems of decision-making, and while it 
                                                 
17  I It is worth mentioning that it is quite rare for fundamental values to be held absolutely (or 
absolutely consistently). 
is certainly an important component of any decision-making process, it is unlikely to 
be capable of dealing satisfactorily with the complexities inherent in contentious areas 
of science such as SC research.  In short, a purely evidence-based approach will 
frequently fail to finally (or persuasively) adjudicate between options, particularly 
where options have a value-informed component,18 but that does not diminish their 
power when deployed expertly (as is often the case in ideological or contested 
political settings). 
As suggested above, this typology uses concepts of the future, or what 
constitutes a desirable future, and whether particular developments are moving 
society toward or away from that future, and it marshals (often contested) evidence in 
support of the position taken.  The empirical data obtained disclosed the following 
arguments which exemplify this typology: 
 
• The knowledge gleaned from ESC research will encourage reproductive 
cloning and/or genetic modification of humans, which turns humans into 
manufactured entities and is therefore undesirable. 
 
• Commercial interests are driving ESC research with the result that outcomes 
are not targeted at the greatest human needs, but rather at the greatest short-
term profit (evidence offered), with the result that research will benefit 
primarily (or only) the rich or may be undertaken for unworthy endeavours 
such as cosmetic benefits. 
 
• The potential from adult SC research  is currently underestimated, and will 
ultimately produce more benefit than ESCR. 
 
• The use of human embryos in research is ethically questionable (evidence 
offered), and we should be wary of creating a world where human embryos are 
routinely used. 
 
• There exists a huge need for medical innovation (evidence offered), and the 
consequences of not pursuing ESCR will be more negative than the 
consequences of doing it. 
 
These arguments make clear the deployment of evidence, the identification of trends, 
and the consequentialist bent of this typology; common starting positions were 
evidence-based claims followed by inquiries about the consequences of doing (or not 
doing) something, and whether those consequences were good or bad.  They 
demonstrate the difficulties (and shortcomings) of trying to “crystal ball” in the 
innovation environment, but also the inevitability of doing so given the requirement 
for research to be regulated in advance of knowledge of its outcomes. 
 
(3) The “Competing Interests” or “See-Saw” Typology 
 
This category of argument is implicitly founded on an identification with interests and 
                                                 
18  Examples of this shortcoming in evidence-based approaches are available from other areas of 
technology.  For example, the difficulties encountered in risk assessments in the environmental setting 
suggest that making decisions purely on the basis of what looks like impartial evidence is unlikely to 
provide solutions that are acceptable to everyone. 
pragmatic considerations of who wins and who loses.  Interest-based arguments are 
often caricatured as being based on self-interest, but one can (and interviewees often 
did) advance interest-based arguments that served the interests of groups to which the 
advocate does not belong (eg: marginalised or vulnerable groups).  However, it is also 
not always inappropriate to focus on the interests of the self, particularly where 
individuals have valuable insights that others cannot imagine or predict.  For example, 
an individual may be so situated that only s/he can describe what it is like to be in 
particular circumstances (eg: people with a diagnosed illness are best positioned to 
explain the difficulties engendered by, and the unfolding consequences of, that 
illness).  
The following are examples of arguments made during the interviews that are 
categorised as interest-based in nature: 
 
• We (society) need to balance the unmet needs of the sick with a sensitivity 
towards the embryo. 
 
• If we are to proceed with ESC research, then we must employ appropriate 
consent procedures with respect to embryo donors to ensure their interests are 
protected. 
 
• Throwing spare embryos away is much worse than using them for SC 
derivation. 
 
• The elderly are too often marginalised in our society, and SC-based therapies 
are potentially more likely to be of benefit for them. 
 
One can see from the above that arguments of this typology are often directed at 
trying balance out interests (so winning and losing isn’t such a stark, zero-sum game).  
Although advocates deploying these arguments might (seem to) vacillate or “see-saw” 
back and forth on a given point, interest-based arguments can be valuable for 
exposing a wider range of relevant considerations, and should not be dismissed as 
being less worthy than other types of argumentation. 
 
(4) Summation: A Variety of Tools for a Controversial Subject in a 
Plural Society 
 
The above does not (nor could it ever) capture the full richness and nuance of the 
interviewees’ views.  However, it offers a suitable basis by which one can reasonably 
articulate and differentiate the typologies, accepting, of course, that they overlap and 
interact intimately; a single typology can be used to encourage ESC research or, in the 
mouth of another, to constrain it, and one’s position on ESCR can be advanced under 
any or all of the typologies discovered.  For example, one might advance a position 
antagonistic to ESC research as follows: 
 
• Core Values Argument: The embryo is akin to a fully formed human and must 
be respected and treated as such, and to use it in research is ethically 
questionable. 
 
• Evidence-to-Consequences Argument: The consequences of pursuing ESCR, 
being the advancement of cloning knowledge and increasing likelihood of 
human modification, may well be more negative than seeking (potentially less 
effective) therapies through other means. 
 
• Competing Interests Argument: The unmet needs of the sick must be balanced 
against the very real needs of the embryo and a sensitivity towards the position 
of the infertile women (embryo donors), who constitute a vulnerable group.  
 
In short, moving between typologies in advancing a position, whether deliberately or 
accidentally, is neither uncommon nor difficult, with the result that value-based 
arguments often get tangled up with, or transformed into, interest-based arguments 
(ie: an argument may change over the course of its advancement).  This entanglement 
does not diminish the value of the typologies for assisting us in making sense (through 
categorisation) of what is occurring in the maelstrom that is ESCR politics and 
regulation, but it means caution and attention to what people are saying (and whether 
they are saying it consistently) is important.. 
 
II. THE SITES EXAMINED: THE TREATMENT OF STEM CELL 
RESEARCH “IN THE WORLD” 
 
Having identified the typologies (and indeed some of the substantive arguments), it is 
appropriate to consider their deployment “on the ground in the real world”, and more 
particularly variations in dependence on the different typologies in different fora.  We 
now examine the appearance of these typologies in three different settings  within the 
ESC research arena, each one illustrating a different site of science governance, 
namely the political (determining legal boundaries), the hybrid policy-administrative 
(identifying and enforcing boundaries for laboratory research), and the administrative 
(enforcing boundaries in the commercial context).  The intention is to examine the 
types of arguments made, not to conduct any ethical analysis of them; the emphasis 
here is on process rather than substance, and the exercise is interpretive rather than 
evaluative. 
 
(1) Stem Cell Politics: Determining the Legal Scope of SCR 
 
The UK’s legislative position on ESCR – the 2001 Regulations – is both dependent 
on, and a predictable extension of, the debates which preceded it and lead to the 
original HFEA 1990 (eg: the work of the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology, chaired by then Dame Mary Warnock).19  Very 
generally, it was opined by the majority of the Warnock Committee,20 and accepted 
for purposes of the subsequent legislation, that embryos, though not having the same 
moral status as adults and other animals, have a special moral status which demands 
that any research undertaken on them complies with certain criteria and limitations.  
As such, not only the permissibility of embryo research, but its association with 
special protection, was established prior to the discovery of ESCs. 
                                                 
19  See S. Parry, supra, note 4, D. Morgan, “Ethics, Economics and the Exotic: The Early Career 
of the HFEA” (2004) 12 Health Care Analysis 7-26, and S. Harmon, “Control of Reproductive 
Treatment and Research: From the Moral to the Political to the Legal – and Back Again? or ‘There and 
Back Again, A Regulator’s (Hobbit’s) Odyssey (Holiday)’” in C. Lyall et al. (eds.), The Limits to 
Governance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) (forthcoming). 
20  Department of Health, (1984), Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology, 1984, Cmnd 9314. 
According to some, the Parliamentary debates on the 2001 Regulations 
demonstrated a distinct lack of will (on the part of the government) to accept any new 
ethical issues for discussion, or to re-open debates about the status of the embryo.21  
Hauskeller argues that the UK’s rather liberal ESCR regulations (within Europe and 
particularly compared to Germany) can be understood as an outcome of the tendency 
to prefer utilitarian, case-by-case ethical reasoning over broader deontological 
considerations.  When SC research became a reality in late 1998, she argues, embryo 
research had already become “a regulated but normal practice in Britain”.22  
Similarly, Banchoff explains that the different regulatory approach adopted by the UK 
(again as compared to Germany) can be explained, at least in part, by history.  The 
political institutions empowered a powerful pro-research coalition and the Prime 
Minister, who advocated a liberal stance on SC research, was able to push an agenda 
characterised by solidarity with the sick over that of embryonic life.23 
This, then, is the environment to which we now briefly turn, considering in 
particular the relevant political debates undertaken in the House of Commons on 17 
November 2000 and 19 December 2000, and in the House of Lords on 22 January 
2001.  We examine the types of arguments made as informed by our proposed 
typologies, not the rhetorical devices that were used, nor the appeals to the character 
of the pre-existing institutions that were made.24  So situated, let us turn to the 
political debates and seek to identify the typologies. Quotes have been selected to be 
illustrative of the types of argument being made. 
It should perhaps come as little surprise that the Core Values (or Red / Green 
Button Issues) typology is used frequently, most often in relation to the status of the 
embryo.  It should also come as little surprise that such arguments have been 
deployed in support of positions on both sides of the issue, namely in support of the 
previous finding that embryo research is permissible within constraints, and in support 
of the claim that embryo research (and ESC research) is abhorrent.  For example, the 
following two excerpts constitute claims to values that should be upheld: 
 
The 1990 Act endorses the principle in the Warnock Report that a 
measure of respect should be accorded to embryos, and that research 
involving embryos should be subject to moral constraints and regulation.  
That is absolutely right.25 
 
As a mother and a grandmother … the fact that we have scientists who 
think of these [embryos], who are definitely human, simply as a source 
to be exploited in obtaining cells and tissue, I find frightening.26 
 
Another Parliamentarian, in an argument that also discloses shades of the Competing 
                                                 
21  See S. Parry, supra, note 4, C. Hauskeller, “How Traditions of Ethical Reasoning and 
Institutional Processes Shape Stem Cell Research in Britain” (2004) 29 J Medicine and Philosophy 
509-532, T. Banchoff, “Path Dependence and Value-Driven Issues: The Comparative Politics of Stem 
Cell Research” (2005) 57 World Politics 200-230, and others.  See also the opening statements of 
Yvette Cooper, Under-Secretary of State for Health, House of Commons Hansard, 17 November 2000, 
col. 1175, which defer to the debates preceding the adoption of the HFEA 1990 and express a desire 
not to repeat them. 
22  C. Hauskeller, ibid, at 515. 
23  T. Banchoff, supra, note 21. 
24  Which analyses have been undertaken elsewhere: see S. Parry, supra, note 4, and others. 
25  House of Commons Hansard, 17 November 2000, col. 1180. 
26  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1204. 
Interests typology, argued that there exists a moral imperative to allow research into 
life-saving therapies: 
 
I am driven to my view on the issue not by science, although that is 
an important factor, but by the ethical duty I believe we as 
representatives have to do what is right. After careful examination, I 
have judged that, although it will entail the curtailment of the rights 
of some early embryos, allowing research into life-saving therapies 
is the right thing to do.27 
 
Contrary to this, questions were raised over the value properly attributed to science 
and scientists and the (fundamental?) right to pursue science (the BSE crisis and other 
events having shaken belief that scientific activity is benign or neutral), and value-
based arguments were made against the apparent free-reign given to researchers.  For 
example, it was suggested that, “the age of deference to scientists is over.  It will seem 
to many people that science has failed us in many spheres, and the fact that there is a 
lack of proper control over scientists is – with, as always, the great benefit of 
hindsight – obvious.”28 
The Evidence-to-Consequence (or Crystal Ball) typology was also used.  
Although some stressed the huge potential of ESC research to produce future cures 
for degenerative diseases, while others recognised the uncertainty around future 
developments, many still considered research to be inherently worthwhile.  For 
example: 
 
• “[Embryonic stem cells] … have huge potential because, if scientists can 
understand how they work, it may be possible to re-programme adult cells 
providing the potential to develop treatments and cures for all sorts of 
degenerative diseases”29 
 
• “The view of the Chief Medical Officer’s expert group was that the long-term 
promise of stem cells from adult tissue could equal or surpass that of 
embryonic stem cells.  However … many scientists believe that research into 
embryonic stem cells is vital.” 30 
 
• “None of us knows exactly what discoveries stem cell research could lead us 
to … but potentially revolutionary treatments lie within our grasp.” 31 
 
• “As a non-scientists, I cannot know whether even that analysis is right. I do 
not know whether stem cell research – adult and embryonic – will ever 
deliver a solution to Parkinson’s.  However, we should allow those who have 
identified potential in that route the chance to realise the ambition of a 
solution to the disease.” 32 
 
The future was also presented in negative terms, either as a dangerous journey with an 
                                                 
27  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1217. 
28  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1284. 
29  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1178. 
30  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1178. 
31  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1182. 
32  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1200. 
unknown destination, or a journey leading inevitably to disaster (ie: to human 
reproductive cloning):  
 
• “[People] may also be alarmed at the danger of embarking on a journey the 
destination of which is unclear to many of us at this point.”33 
 
• “Moreover, although the Government assert that they are completely opposed 
to reproductive cloning – I imagine that everyone in the House must take that 
view – Lord Winston, among other fertility experts, has affirmed that 
therapeutic cloning will lead to reproductive cloning within twenty years.”34 
 
• “It is true that if the [2001 Regulations] are not introduced, the research is 
likely to continue in other countries where there may be no regulatory 
framework to govern either the way in which … research takes place, or the 
purposes of the research.”35 
 
The latter representation in particular is an excellent example of an MP crystal-balling 
a (near) future in which the research is not permitted, the claimed consequence being 
that research will proceed in other jurisdictions with no or less palatable regulation, 
and, additionally, domestic entities (pharmaceutical and biotech companies) will 
therefore lose out (and be injured) for no good reason. 
The Competing Interests (or See-Saw) typology is reflected in comments that 
imply a search to find a balance in the weight given to specific groups.  For example: 
 
• “How many of the letters that his constituents have sent him arose from a 
genuine individual interest in the matter, and how many may have been 
prompted by interests groups or even – who knows – by faith groups?”36 
 
• “I know that it is right that in all we do in our personal lives we should be 
guided by our beliefs, but I have some difficulty when those beliefs are 
imposed on others.”37 
 
It is also implicated in concerns over the weight that should be given to scientific 
arguments and to supporting the UK pharmaceutical and research base: 
 
• “It is clear that the scientific arguments are all on one side, which is to extend 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.”38 
 
• “… [B]ut does he accept that the key issue at stake in the Government’s 
introduction of these regulations is the defence of the United Kingdom’s 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological research base?”39 
 
There is also evidence that consideration was given to the balance that must be 
                                                 
33  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1183. 
34  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1206. 
35  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1230. 
36  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1184. 
37  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1195. 
38  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1194. 
39  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1194. 
achieved between our duties to the sick and our duties to the embryo.  For example, 
Dr. Evan Harris MP stated that, “What I will argue more cautiously is that our duties 
towards the sick and vulnerable (which I take to be at the heart of Jewish and 
Christian ethics) should finally be given priority over our duties to those embryos that 
should never be implanted.”40  Additionally, there were questions posed about what 
weight should be given to the fact that embryos are destroyed in ESCR when, as 
“spare” embryos in IVF treatment, they would be destroyed anyway.  For example, 
Dr. Michael Clark MP queried, “what is the logic of continuing with IVF treatment, 
producing 237,000 embryos more than we need, and destroying them rather than 
allowing them to be used for research that could benefit others?”41 
On the whole, then, the Parliamentary debates can be characterised as “rich” 
insofar as they disclose the deployment of all three typologies in support of (and 
against) a range of possibilities.  From this, we can conclude that, from a purely 
discursive point of view, the full range of our argument types were made and 
considered in the establishment of a regulatory framework for ESC research.  
Although, we draw no conclusions in this assessment as to the efficacy of each type of 
argument from the point of view of changing opinions or marshalling support, we 
would suggest that reliance on all of these discursive tools is encouraging from a 
democracy-in-motion point of view.  They suggest a full airing of opinions and, more 
importantly, a range of means of presenting evidence and/or making a point.  This, of 
course, is to be encouraged. 
The pressures on Parliamentary time, however, are such that these debates 
take place relatively infrequently.  One might note the massive scientific changes that 
had taken place between the adoption of the HFEA 1990 and the time the 2001 
Regulations were being considered.  During that scientifically dynamic time, the 
implementation of the HFEA 1990 had been  the responsibility of the HFEA, and it is 
to that institution that we turn next. 
 
(2) Stem Cell Policy and Administration: Identifying and Enforcing 
Boundaries for Scientific Activity 
 
Having considered the political arena (ie: the gestation of the law), we now turn to a 
more complex site in which the law is interpreted, shaped, and applied in a dynamic 
setting; a site which is dominated by the HFEA, an independent statutory body 
established in 1991 and charged with both advising government and overseeing the 
use of gametes and embryos in fertility treatment and related research.42  We 
examined the Minutes of the HFEA’s Research Licence Committee (RLC) for 
meetings held on 17 May 2006, 11 July 2006, and 14 September 2006, in relation to 
the Newcastle Fertility Clinic’s application to vary the licence for Research Project 
R0152 (a project to derive ESC lines using nuclear transfer and parthenogenetically 
activated oocytes).43  Again, the intention is not to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
40  House of Commons Hansard, 17 Nov 2000, col. 1218. 
41  House of Commons Hansard, 19 Dec 2000, col. 250. 
42  See s. 8, HFEA 1990.  For more on the HFEA, see http://www.hfea.gov.uk/.  This dual 
function has given rise to some tension and much criticism: see D. Morgan, “Ethics, Economics and the 
Exotic: The Early Career of the HFEA” (2004) 12 Health Care Analysis 7-26, and House of Commons 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law: Fifth 
Report of Session 2004-05 (2005), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmsctech/7/702.htm. 
43  This application was chosen because it represents an attempt to amend an existing licensed 
project by expanding the scope of embryo sourcing via processes that are quite controversial.  Of equal 
HFEA, but to analyse the typology of arguments that are utilised in the few publicly 
available records generated by the application. 
As a statutory body, the RLC must comply with its empowering provisions, in 
this case s. 3 of Schedule 2 of the HFEA 1990 (as amended by the 2001 Regulations).  
In conformity with that provision, the RLC adopted a very structured (almost 
ritualised) approach to evaluating research proposals, generally employing a three-
step process: 
 
• Step 1: The research activity is identified and the RLC ascertains that it is not 
prohibited under the HFEA 1990 and 2001 Regulations. 
 
• Step 2: The RLC determines whether the research activity is necessary or 
desirable for the purposes of (a) increasing knowledge about the development 
of embryos, (b) increasing knowledge about serious disease, or (c) enabling 
any such knowledge to be applied in developing treatments for serious disease. 
 
• Step 3: The RLC addresses the question of whether an increase in the number 
of fresh eggs is needed. 
 
In the subject application, Newcastle sought permission to source human eggs in two 
new ways: (1) through altruistic donation for the express purpose of research;44 and 
(2) through egg sharing arrangements.45  Having already issued a licence, the RLC 
accepted without comment that the research was not prohibited.  It accepted the 
clinic’s report that it was obtaining some 66 fresh eggs annually by donation of 
surplus from fertility patients, and it was prepared to accept that, “a lack of fresh eggs 
was delaying progress with the project [and] this new source of fresh eggs would be 
desirable for the project because it would increase the number of fresh eggs available 
to the researchers.”46  However, it questioned whether fresh eggs were really 
“necessary” for the research, and it was on this issue that the application turned. 
With respect to altruistic donation, the RLC initially held that the discomfort 
and clinical risk faced by the woman undergoing an egg retrieval procedure (for 
purely altruistic purposes) outweighed the applicant’s need to supply fresh eggs for its 
research, noting parenthetically some of the ethical issues around egg donation 
implicated by the conduct of Dr. Hwang, the discredited South Korean scientist.47  In 
response to this, the applicant argued that (1) the evidence in favour of fresh eggs was 
much stronger than stated by the RLC, (2) the risks associated with their collection 
were manageable within their clinic, and (3) there was precedent for altruistic egg 
donation for fertility treatment and for research which does not require a licence from 
the HFEA.48  In light of these representations, and with the imposition of additional 
                                                                                                                                            
importance, however, was the fact that it represents one of the few applications supported by publicly 
available written documents, as opposed to merely a summary on the HFEA website. 
44  The term “altruistic donation” describes a process whereby a person who is not undergoing 
fertility treatment is nonetheless willing to undergo hormone stimulation and egg retrieval purely for 
the purposes of donating the resulting eggs to the research project. 
45  The term “egg sharing” describes a process whereby patients undergoing fertility treatment are 
prepared to donate a share of their eggs to the research project in return for receiving reduced costs for 
the fertility treatment. 
46  RCL Minutes, 17 May 2006, at para. 7. 
47  RCL Minutes, 17 May 2006, paras. 8 and 9. 
48  RCL Minutes, 14 September 2006, paras. 3, 4 and 5. 
precautions so as to reduce the potential for coercion,49 the RLC overturned its initial 
decision and permitted the sourcing of eggs through altruistic research-specific 
donation. 
With respect to egg sharing, the RLC appeared to be influenced by the 
realisation that women participating in egg sharing would still have to pay part of the 
costs of their fertility treatment, and this payment would be more than when egg 
sharing with other patients purely for fertility treatment purposes.  In short, additional 
financial incentives would not strongly influence (or coerce) women in their decision 
to donate eggs for research.  Moreover, the woman would not be exposed to any 
additional risk or pain because she would be undergoing the egg retrieval anyway.  
Finally, the egg sharing consent form would be completed by the woman when 
accompanied by a member of the clinical team not involved in the research.  Given all 
of the above, the RLC was satisfied that egg sharing was acceptable.50 
As is obvious from the above, both of the proposed new sourcing procedures 
were considered primarily within the rubric of a competing interests approach. 
Although one could argue that an Evidence-to-Consequence approach was also taken 
insofar as the RLC considered, at least in passing, the practical outcome of a coercive 
environment obtaining, and the evidence suggests that Newcastle advanced and 
supported its position by arguments from the Competing Interests (or See-Saw) 
typology.  Ultimately, the RLC took care to balance risks and benefits, failing 
completely to engage with the core values arena.  From a discursive perspective, then, 
it deployed only one (debatably two) of the typologies. 
This should not necessarily be taken as a defect in the way in which the HFEA 
handled the application or performed its function.  As a law-administering body with 
a specified remit, it is appropriate for the HFEA to rely on transparent and 
reproducible procedures that comply with provided policy criteria which are to be 
implemented again and again over time.   It is perhaps appropriate that the range of 
typologies which arise in this setting should contract from that evident in the political 
setting, and that the objectives for which they are deployed should narrow.  However, 
we must recall two unique facets of the HFEA which separate it from the usual 
administrative, policy-implementation body. 
First, the HFEA is applying the law in a realm of rapid change (ie: 
technologies evolve, societal perceptions change, the nature of requests/applications 
transforms).  In such a setting, accretion occurs whereby the law is required to 
address, and the HFEA is required to respond to, unanticipated scenarios.  
Administrative agencies often refrain from foraying into such new areas, citing the 
need for Parliament to amend/expand its statutory authority before it could act, but the 
HFEA has taken a more robust view of the scope of its authority, perhaps mindful of 
the nature of science and the general desire for the UK to remain competitive.51  The 
result is that the HFEA can potentially become disengaged from its original remit; as 
decisions are made on a case-by-case basis (a perfectly valid approach in areas of 
rapid development), there is the potential to drift away from what was intended by the 
                                                 
49  Additional precautions included the following: (1) no one employed by or otherwise 
connected with the research could donate eggs; (2) potential donors were to receive full information 
about the scope and probable results of the research, including advice that the research would be 
unlikely to lead to clinical applications in the near future); and (3) potential donors were to receive 
information on potential risks of donation. 
50  RCL Minutes, 11 July 2006. 
51  For an example of the HFEA asserting a robust and purposive interpretation of its authority, 
see Quintavalle v. HFEA, [2005] UKHL 28.  For a comment on this case, see S. Sheldon, “Saviour 
Siblings and the Discretionary Power of the HFEA” (2005) 13 Med Law Rev 403-411. 
policy framework developed by the richer Parliamentary debates, particularly where 
the logic of interests is primarily relied on as opposed to the fuller range of typologies. 
Second, and linked to this, the HFEA also serves as an advisory body, a 
function for which one might expect it to consider the broadest possible range of 
issues (and therefore call upon the full range of typologies).  Of the (many) criticisms 
directed at the HFEA, those which seem particularly justified  challenge its tendency 
to make policy on a case-by-case basis.  Such an approach, demonstrated above, 
permits it to: (1) avoid broader debates reliant on a wider range of argument 
typologies; and (2) narrow the evidence on which it relies.  For example, contrast the 
RLC’s assessment of egg sharing to that undertaken elsewhere,52 where, on the issue 
of remuneration (or reduced treatment costs), broader and better evidence has been 
brought to bear which suggests that couples seeking fertility treatment are often under 
immense stress, and can easily perceive coercion (even when no such intention 
exists), an issue barely noticed in the application.53 
 
(3) Stem Cell Administration: Enforcing Boundaries in the 
Commercial Setting (Boundaries Re-Visited / Re-Hashed) 
 
The last site we consider is that of administration in commercialisation, notionally a 
key intermediate step in the pipeline from initial idea to socially useful and publicly 
available ESC-based product/process (although products intended for human 
consumption/application must also navigate the safety standards regime which can 
take another 10 or more years).  This site is occupied by a large number of actors, one 
of the most important of which is the EPO, which derives its authority from the 
European Patent Convention (1973)54 (EPC), and has the multiple functions of 
supporting innovation, competitiveness and economic growth, strengthening 
European cooperation, and creating standard rules of treatment and procedure for the 
protection and commercialisation of inventions.55  Under the EPC, patents can be 
challenged or “opposed” by any interested natural or legal person within nine months 
of the issuance of a patent.56  The Opposition Division (OD) of the EPO reviews the 
patentability of opposed inventions on grounds specified in Article 102 EPC, and 
determines whether the patent can be maintained given the opponent’s submissions.57  
Although they can be document-based reviews, oral hearings before the OD are not 
uncommon,58 and it must render a decision which affirms, amends or revokes the 
                                                 
52  See C. Roberts & K. Throsby, “Paid to Share: IVF Patients, Eggs and Stem Cell Research” 
(2008) 66 Social Science & Medicine 159-169, and S. Parry, “(Re)constructing Embryos in Stem Cell 
Research: Exploring the Meaning of Embryos for People Involved in Fertility Treatments” (2006) 62 
Social Science & Medicine 2349-2359. 
53  Following this RLC decision, the HFEA undertook a public consultation on donating eggs for 
research, ultimately reporting that the majority of respondents were in favour of altruistic egg 
donations, but that this majority reduces when considering egg sharing (largely due to concerns around 
coercion): see HFEA, Donating Eggs for Research: Safeguarding Donors (2007), available at 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/donating_eggs_for_research_safeguarding_donors_consultation_FINAL.
pdf. 
54  Available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/1973/e/ma1.html. 
55  For more on the EPO and its purposes, see www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/general/e/epo_general.htm. 
56  See Articles 58, 99(1) and 115 EPC, and Clause D-I-4, EPO Guidelines for Examination. 
57  See Note on Opposition Procedure in the EPO, [1989] OJ EPO 417. 
58  For more on the OD panel and opposition procedures, see EPC Articles 19, 99-104 and 113-
126, Rules 55-63, Implementing Regulations of the EPC, and Parts D and E, EPO Guidelines for 
patent based on the grounds of the opposition and the evidence tendered.59 
Again, we might note that the EPO is not purely administrative.  Rather it, and 
its OD, can be characterised as performing the functions of a “boundary 
organisation”.60  It sits between different social worlds; that of science and science 
regulation, on the one hand, and of commerce and intellectual property, on the other.  
The OD in particular is a site where scientists and entrepreneurs who wish to 
transition from the research setting to the commercial setting by patenting ESCR 
outputs might (and do) clash with both competitors and interested bodies who oppose, 
on a variety of grounds, their attempt to monopolise an invention.  As such, the OD 
attempts to perform a role that is useful to a variety of stakeholders (antagonists), 
involving people from a variety of communities, including the legal profession in a 
mediating role, and it fulfils a function that would be difficult or impossible for either 
community to fulfil on its own. 
Of course, within this role, the EPO can only consider actions and arguments 
within standardised formats.  For example, patents can only be opposed on certain 
grounds, namely that the criteria for patentability have not been met, the disclosure is 
insufficient, or the claims are over-inclusive.61  With respect to patentability, 
inventions must be novel, contain an inventive step and be amenable to industrial 
application, and it must not otherwise be unpatentable as, for example, contrary to 
morality or ordre public.62  Though originally viewed as an infrequently used but 
necessary safeguard at the margins of the system, the morality provision has become 
an increasingly-utilised tool for managing/influencing innovation.63  Similarly, 
opposition proceedings have also evolved; in 1985, the EPO stated that it would be 
wrong to regard oppositions as contentious proceedings between warring parties 
where the deciding body takes a neutral position;64 by 1993, it described oppositions 
as “contentious proceedings between parties normally representing opposite interests, 
who should be given equally fair treatment”.65 
In this article, we examine the OD’s Minutes of the Oral Proceedings dated 22 
July 2002 (Minutes), and Written Decision dated 21 July 2003 (Decision) in 
EDINBURGH / Animal Transgenic Stem Cells,66 a patent filed on 21 April 1994 and 
held by the University of Edinburgh. This claimed protection for a process for 
                                                                                                                                            
Examination.  See also G. Paterson, The European Patent System: The Law and Practice of the 
European Patent Convention (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), Ch. 4.B. 
59  See Article 113 EPC.  For more on admissibility and taking of evidence, see Article 117 EPC, 
Rules 71-76, Implementing Regulations of the EPC, Clause E-IV-1, EPO Guidelines for Examination. 
60  See for example D. Guston, “Boundary Organisations in Environmental Policy and Science: 
An Introduction” (2001) 26 Science, Technology & Human Values 399-408, contained in a special 
issue of that journal which focuses on boundary organisations. 
61  See EPC Articles 52-57 (patentability), 83 (clarity of disclosure), and 61 and 123 (over-
inclusiveness) and Clauses D-III-5 and D-V, EPO Guidelines for Examination. 
62  Article 53 EPC. 
63  For more on its origins and evolution, see O. Mills, Biotechnological Inventions: Moral 
Restraints and Patent Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), at 23, 29-34 and 53, R. Witek, “Ethics and 
Patentability in Biotechnology” (2005) 11 Sci. Eng. Ethics 105-111, and E. Armitage & I. Davies, 
Patents and Morality in Perspective (London: IPI, 1994).  According to Witek, the morality provision 
was included in the EPC without much debate because such provisions had been around domestically 
for some time.  In the UK, it dated back to the Statute of Monopolies 1624, but was interpreted 
primarily in relation to sexual morality (ie: it was considered that the government should not have to 
publish obscene documents or instructions on how to perform acts which would constitute breaches of 
the peace). 
64  MOBIL OIL / Opposition by Proprietor, [1985] OJ EPO 299 (Enlarged App Div). 
65  ROHM & HAAS / Power to Examine, [1993] OJ EPO 408 (Enlarged App Div). 
66  European Patent Application No. 94913174.2. 
genetically modifying animal stem cells which offered a survival advantage over 
differentiated cells.  Opposition proceedings were initiated by Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and eleven other parties,67 who opposed the patent on grounds that the 
patent (1) was over-broad, (2) lacked novelty and an inventive step, (3) contained 
insufficient disclosure, and (4) was contrary to morality and ordre public insofar as 
the term “animal stem cells” could include human ESCs. 
With respect to arguments under the first three grounds, the proprietor was 
required to meet technical tests to demonstrate that it had fulfilled the conditions for 
patentability.  As such, the claim that the patent was over-broad was addressed at the 
oral proceedings by correcting cited publications in the application.  The claim that 
the patent lacked novelty and inventive step was addressed by examining the pre-
existing published work and determining that the selectable marker system used by 
the proprietor demonstrated an advantage over the methods disclosed in the prior art.  
The claim that the patent contained insufficient disclosure was addressed through the 
scientific reproducibility of the patent claims advanced.  In short, these issues were 
addressed using the special criteria and language of the patent regime and did not 
implicate the argument typologies outlined above.  Rather, using terminology 
specially relevant to it as a boundary organisation, the EPO applied a series of 
boundary objects (legal tests which necessitate certain legal evidence) to establish 
whether the conditions for patentability had been met, thereby creating scientific and 
social order, and producing stability. 
However, consideration of the morality provision gives rise to a realm capable 
of a completely different type of exchange; one where such order has yet to be 
produced and where stability has not yet been achieved.  The morality provision states 
that (1) patents shall not be granted for inventions the exploitation of which would be 
contrary to morality or ordre public, and (2) inventions which concern the use of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes are so contrary.68  The OD 
defined morality as relating to the belief, founded on the deeply held and 
conventionally accepted norms of a particular society, that some behaviour is 
right/acceptable and some is wrong/unacceptable.  With respect to identifying 
conventionally accepted norms, however, it stated: 
 
Neither the evaluation of the national legislation nor the assessment of 
the conventionally accepted standards of conduct of European culture 
has revealed a uniform approach with regard to human ESC, and … 
even a uniform estimation of the situation for all contracting states … 
would not automatically [suffice] under Article 53(a) EPC [to render 
an invention unpatentable]. …69 
 
Given this, it noted that (1) patent law must be applied so as to respect the 
fundamental principles of dignity and integrity, (2) the illustrative list of unpatentable 
                                                 
67  The Opponents were: (1) Greenpeace Deutschland e.V; (2) PDS-Bundestagfraktion; (3) 
Ökumenischer rat der Kirchen in Österreich; (4) Bundesrepublik Deutschland; (5) Alliance Pour les 
Droits de la Vie; (6) Aktion Leben Österreich; (7) Greenpeace e.V. Sammeleinspruch; (8) Bündnis 90 
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Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft; (12) Regierung der Republik Italien; (13) Dr. Jürgen Kaiser; (14) 
Bündnis 90 die Grünen. 
68  See Article 53(a) EPC, and Rule 23d(c), which states: “Under Article 53(a), European patents 
shall not be granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, concern uses of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.” 
69  OD Decision, Para. 2.5.3. 
inventions (in the EU Directive 98/44/EC) is not exhaustive and can be expanded, and 
(3) although inventions using human embryos for industrial/commercial purposes are 
unpatentable, inventions for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes which are applied and 
are useful to the embryo are excepted. 
Against this background, the Opponents deployed a variety of arguments.  
Some very few deployed a Core Values typology insofar as they challenged the 
desirability of research on embryos.  For example, one Opponent argued that “embryo 
research should be allowed for medical reasons only, and this patent would provide a 
commercial incentive for research into and experiments using human embryos”.70  
Similarly, one Opponent argued from an Evidence-to-Consequences perspective, 
introducing herself as a children’s author, owner of a small publishing firm for 
children’s books, children’s advocate, and grandmother, emphasising that she was 
worried about the future, the environment and nature, which would become more and 
more artificial, and then pleading against the grant of life patents.71  More often, 
Opponents argued from a Competing Interests typology.  For example: 
 
• The protection of humans has to be given priority over the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions and scientific interests.72 
 
• The proprietor provided no evidence indicating prior informed consent on the 
part of those from whom this biological material was taken, nor did it indicate 
whether there was any profit motive involved in giving consent, and thus it 
cannot be said to have complied with ordre public.73 
 
• Germany, Italy and the Netherlands comprise some 200 million EU citizens 
who are opposed to this patent, thereby outnumbering supporters.74 
 
The proprietor responded that the research was conducted in the UK under licence 
and that it had complied with statutory requirements re: consent procedures, and it 
was not the role of the EPO to act as a moral censor or to refuse a patent on legal 
research.  Moreover, it argued that the subject patent did not require human embryos, 
and while UK legislation prohibited the commercialisation of embryos, it did not 
prohibit this invention.75  In short, core values had been considered elsewhere and 
patentability was supported by the EGE and other authorities, and competing interests 
had been arbitrated by national legislation, and had been protected. 
Although the expectation might be that the OD would need to engage with 
core values re: the morality of commercialising inventions derived from ESC 
research, its approach suggests that it considered the core values engagement to have 
taken place elsewhere (eg: the debates around the adoption of the EPC, Directive 
98/44/EC, and national legislation).  Despite an underlying concern for core values 
such as human dignity, core values were actually relegated to vague background ideas 
against which the real debate was the interpretation of the intention behind the various 
                                                 
70  OD Minutes of Oral Proceedings, p. 17, section 15.1. 
71  Ibid, p. 22, section 15.6. 
72  Ibid, p. 20, section 15.3. 
73  Ibid, p. 21, section 15.4. 
74  Ibid, p. 18, section 15.1.  Although the OD is to have recourse to conventionally accepted 
standards of conduct in the EU, it rejected this argument outright on the basis that the EPC and the 
Implementing Regulations made measurements irrelevant: see ibid, p. 26, section. 22. 
75  Ibid, p. 23-24, section 17. 
EPC provisions ie: it was not prepared to engage with substantive ethical issues.  As 
such, it gave little weight to the few arguments from the Core Values typology, and 
scant more weight to the arguments from the Evidence-to-Consequences typology.  
As suggested above, the main assessment undertaken by the OD was an instrumental 
one concerned with the source(s) for boundary-setting and the interpretation of those 
sources. 
In addition to the arguments of the parties, the OD made reference to Opinion 
16 of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE),76 a 15-
member panel of EU-appointed advisors which undertook a round-table consultation, 
held four expert hearings, and commissioned two reports.  With respect to the 
morality of ESCR itself, the EGE had previously stated that respect for different 
philosophical, moral, or legal approaches, and for diverse cultures, is a necessary 
ethical dimension of building a democratic European society and as such, although 
some countries forbid ESCR, where it is allowed for the purpose of developing new 
treatments to cure infertility, severe diseases or injuries, it is “hard to see any specific 
argument which would prohibit extending the scope of such research”.77  With respect 
to patenting such research, the EGE, deploying a Competing Interests type argument, 
claimed that the consequences of forbidding SC and SC-line patenting would be a 
major slowing of research contrary to public and patient interests.78  The bulk of its 
argument, however, adopted the language of the boundary organisation  rather than 
that of the ethical arena.  For example, it opined that:79 
 
• isolated SCs should not be patentable as this may be considered a form of 
commercialisation of the human body and would lead to over-broad patents as 
they have a number of different potential uses; 
 
• SC lines which have been modified (genetically or otherwise) should be 
patentable; and 
 
• processes involving human SC have no special ethical obstacles and should be 
patentable. 
 
This Opinion was then evaluated by the OD on the basis of its compliance with 
concepts defined by the OD’s boundary tools, and it was found wanting; the OD 
identified a number of discrepancies and problems in the arguments made, concluding 
rather dismissively that, “due to its many inconsistencies, logical flaws, and 
incompatibility with existing patent law and the EU Directive, the Opinion must be 
disregarded in toto.”80  In the end, it concluded that the exception to patenting, which 
                                                 
76  EGE, Opinion 16: Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Human Stem Cells 
(2002), at http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/avis16_en.pdf. 
77  EGE, Opinion 15: Ethical Aspects of Human Stem Cell Research and Use (2000), at 
http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/avis15_en.pdf, at 15-16. 
78  Ibid, at 14, para. 2.1. 
79  EGE, supra, note 74, at 15. 
80  OD Minutes of Oral Proceedings, p. 25, section 2.5.4.  The tragedy of the EGE Opinion was 
that it was utterly dismissed.  This may have been, in part, because of a mismatch in the discursive 
typologies used between the EGE and the OD (ie: the “language” of the EGE was not translatable into 
OD action and its use of patenting “language” was not deemed acceptable by the OD).  All of this 
despite the fact that the EPO was apparently involved in the pre-Opinion round table.  Note that the 
EGE has given notice of its desire to revisit the issue of patenting biological materials: see EGE, 
had traditionally and fairly consistently been interpreted very narrowly, deserved a 
wider interpretation, thereby expanding its scope and potential impact.81  In the result, 
the main request of the proprietor was not allowed in its original form (ie: it had to be 
amended and limited to mouse ESCs).  The proprietor subsequently appealed,82 but 
the appeal was eventually withdrawn at oral proceedings held on 20 November 
2007.83 
For present purposes, we can conclude that the EPO is clearly uncomfortable 
with the utilisation of the subject typologies, preferring a more instrumental 
assessment within the parameters of its boundary tools.  This is amply demonstrated 
by its approach to the morality provision, which it appears unable or unwilling to 
apply robustly, even in cases concerning controversial biotech inventions over which 
societal views diverge.  In this respect, the EPO exhibits what might be called 
“regulatory atrophy”.  Despite its attempt to incorporate Directive 98/44/EC into its 
processes, it continues to rely on an instrument and a decision-making framework 
from the past  pre-biotech revolution, and has yet to (re)fashion its boundary tools (or 
more accurately its decision-making frameworks) to fit the modern context.  A more 
relevant boundary tool, given the legal responsibilities of the EPO and the 
increasingly contested nature of the inventions over which it must adjudicate, might 
direct it to adopt a wider assessment, offer it the possibility of better evidence, and 
ensure that it considers both innovator and wider social aspirations. 
 
(4) Summation 
 
Our assessment of the governance of SCs at these three sites disclose rather large 
variations in the utilisation of arguments of different types.  The first (and final) 
arbiter of whether ESCR should be permitted appears to be Parliament, and it is here 
that the greatest variety of arguments and values are brought to bear.  Afterwards, the 
prevalence of the different typologies (and their effectiveness) is somewhat 
circumscribed.  This is not altogether surprising (or troubling) when one considers the 
primary nature and purpose of these other sites, and the primary roles and functions of 
their institutions, which are smaller, appointed, and more circumscribed in 
jurisdiction.  However, it is important to recall that even these more limited 
institutions (eg: the HFEA and EPO) are not purely instrumental or policy-
implementing; they have broader functions in contested areas which arguably 
necessitate deeper and more detailed assessments, and therefore a broader range of 
legal evidence than they have been soliciting.  Given the pace of technological 
change, the bodies applying a narrow range of typologies of argument could be in 
danger of regulatory drift (HFEA) or regulatory atrophy (EPO).  In both cases, but 
particularly with respect to the HFEA, which has a foot in both policy-making and 
administrative arenas, there is room (and probably a need) to encourage and engage 
with a wider range of discursive styles (in challenging cases) while at the same time 
relying on defined and implementable values and tools. 
                                                                                                                                            
Opinion 22: Recommendations on the Ethical Review of hESC FP7 Research Projects (2007), at 
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81  For more on the previous narrow interpretation and the subsequent wider interpretation of the 
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82  See Statement of Grounds of Appeal dated 30 September 2003, and Appeal Submissions 
dated 31 March 2005. 
83  See EPO Letter Confirming Withdrawal of Appeal dated 26 November 2007. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We set out to examine the deployment of three different discursive typologies – Core 
Values, Evidence-to-Consequence and Competing Interests – in three different 
settings of ESC research – the political, the hybrid (policy-administrative) and the 
commercial.  Our analysis demonstrates that, at least in the context of the examples 
studied, the way in which these typologies are deployed in the different sites varies 
greatly. 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, indeed appropriately, the fullest range of typologies 
were evident in the political setting.  We examined some of the Parliamentary debates 
on embryonic and ESCR, but of course the political setting includes a wider range of 
activities than simple debates so we might expect the range of arguments made to be 
even greater than considered herein.  Insofar as biotechnologies (and ESCR-based 
technologies) are deemed to challenge core values and norms, Parliamentary debates 
should and apparently do provide a space for extensive deliberation and the bringing 
to bear of all manner of arguments.  This is encouraging insofar as we can extrapolate 
from the presence of all typologies that a variety of values, interests, evidence and 
concerns were considered and played their part in the formation of the law.  And this, 
of course, suggests that democracy in science, and indeed democracy more broadly, 
both as practices and as social values, is being realised on the ground. 
Having considered and established the legal boundaries for research, 
Parliament has left it to the HFEA to enforce those boundaries in its licensing of 
proposed laboratory research.  Given its dual role as policy advisor and administrator, 
one might have expected the HFEA to entertain a process which engages all 
typologies.  However, with respect to its licensing process, and based on the limited 
evidence available, it seems unprepared to draw on wider sources and diverse 
typologies, preferring instead to rely almost exclusively on the Competing Interests 
typology.84  Of course, we recognise that a licensing procedure must be reasonably 
quick, efficient, cost-effective and reproducible over time, and, as such, must be both 
focused and circumscribed in its scope (ie: the acceptance of every manner of 
argument would likely stretch the process beyond the statutory criteria).   However, 
the arguments and evidence to which the HFEA becomes privy through its other role 
(policy-advisor) could be raised in the licensing setting to enrich that process and the 
basis upon which decisions are made therein.85  Such was not found.  
In the modern setting, the potential for commercialisation is seen as essential 
to the instigation of health innovation.  An important element of that 
commercialisation is the patenting of inventions.  As noted above, ESC research-
based inventions are controversial and have prompted opposition proceedings within 
the EPO.  However, based on the evidence reviewed, the OD appears to expect that 
arguments of all typologies have taken place elsewhere, permitting it to adopt a more 
limited and instrumental process, one which avoids engaging with the sort of debate 
                                                 
84  This is perhaps not surprising given the long history in medical ethics of protecting research 
subjects in medical research by balancing their autonomy and safety interests against the researchers’ 
and society’s interests, from the Nuremburg Code, to the Helsinki Declaration, and so on. 
85  And we have already noted above the example of the diverse and insightful arguments around 
egg-sharing, arguments and evidence which the HFEA apparently ignored in its consideration of an 
egg-sharing request by a licensee.  Having said that, it could be argued that the HFEA’s policy advice 
role should not seep into its licensing functions, but rather should be realised by delivering opinions to 
government and/or indicating to government that a review of existing policy is timely. 
that would support deployment of the subject typologies.  Again, this might normally 
be acceptable in the traditional administrative setting, but the EPO has been assigned 
an adjudicative function over an issue which is  clearly value-driven and amenable to 
a range of argument types (morality), making its failure to be more responsive a 
failure to robustly exercise its remit. 
Given the above, although sites with different primary objectives might be 
expected to have different ways of arguing, we suggest that existing practices do not 
match existing remits (at least with respect to the EPO and, to a lesser extent, the 
HFEA), as defined by their empowering instruments.86  The mismatch (between remit 
and conduct) of these latter two institutions suggests that the values of science 
democracy and justice are not being as well realised as they might be, or indeed 
should be, as suggested by their empowering instruments.  Implementation of 
legislation in a fast-moving field such as biotechnologies like ESC research can be 
problematic.  The HFEA’s dual role offer one method of dealing with this reality, but 
there is a danger of regulatory drift (and, in any event, we would suggest based on the 
limited evidence considered that it isn’t managing that fusion very well).  The EPO, 
though sitting more squarely in the administrative setting, has also been empowered 
to engage with a variety of typologies, but is also failing to cope very well, with the 
result that it is experiencing regulatory atrophy.  In some senses the HFEA and the 
EPO represent opposite sides of the spectrum in dealing with this situation. 
Stakeholders and publics are likely to deploy more than one typology in any 
particular setting (so long as the setting permits it), but their world view naturally 
channels them to emphasise certain values (to the detriment of others) in whatever 
typology they employ.  Stakeholders dissatisfied with existing practices or trajectories 
are likely to employ all of the channels and typologies available to them to secure 
change.  This means that both the HFEA and the EPO are likely to continue to face 
cases and arguments with which they are uncomfortable, and to be challenged about 
their decisions in those cases.  The fact is that, regardless of the site, biotechnological 
praxis raises contentious issues which need to be negotiated (and, because of their 
value-laden nature, re-negotiated).  Although different regulatory instruments and 
organisational structures encourage different values and interests, those operating in 
the biotechnology environment need to be prepared to engage with different norms. 
                                                 
86  This can be contrasted with their fulfilment of their roles as defined by stakeholder 
expectation, which may well be largely satisfied.  Here one should recognise that stakeholders views 
are often very much situated in their particular context, and so may well share the same blinders that 
naturally limit the administrative agencies with which they interact. 
